Perils of Success? The Case of International Investment Protection by van Aaken, Anne
European Business Organization Law Review 9: 1-27 1 
© 2008 T.M.C.ASSER PRESS DOI10.1017/S1566752908000013 
 
Perils of Success? The Case of International 
Investment Protection 
 
 
Anne van Aaken 
 
 
1. Introduction.................................................................................................. 2 
 
2. International investment law: an overview .................................................. 4 
 
3. The success of international investment law................................................ 8 
 
4. The economic logic of BITs ...................................................................... 10 
 
5. The peril of success ................................................................................... 16 
 
6. Conclusion and outlook ............................................................................. 26 
 
 
Abstract 
Foreign direct investment forms an ever more important part of globalised 
market structures, and international investment law has become one of the most 
successful and judicialised areas of public international law. In order to attract 
investment, States commit themselves to treaties that restrict their regulatory 
sovereignty in ways that are sometimes unpredictable, owing to vague terms in 
the treaties and the broad use by investment tribunals of their delegated discre-
tion. 
 This article uses economic contract theory in order to understand whether the 
commitment problem ex ante and the flexibility problem ex post are optimally 
solved. It is hypothesised that the participation constraints on States may be 
overlooked by investment tribunals, thereby leading to an undesired weakening of 
protection of investors in the long run due to reactions by States. First, States 
may opt out of the system, for example by exiting treaties or by non-compliance. 
Second, they may also water down the substantive or procedural protections. 
Third, whereas investment treaties were seen in the beginning as a restraint on 
developing countries, investment increasingly flows to equally highly regulated 
developed countries. As legal protection is reciprocal but the capital flows used 
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to be unilateral, developed countries might also react to their restriction of 
sovereignty, as the United States has already done, for example. These perils 
could lead to a backlash in international investment protection of which indica-
tions are already visible. 
 
Keywords: international investment law, contract theory, fragmentation, mecha-
nism design. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Public international law (PIL) sometimes suffers from ineffectiveness; a phe-
nomenon sometimes used to declare PIL epiphenomenal.1 or to construct 
rationally designed international institutions in order to make it more effective.2 
Traditionally, international lawyers have only rarely asked questions about 
effectiveness,3 and, if they do, they usually assume that the more effective the law 
is, the better. But could PIL also become too successful? International investment 
law is one of the issue areas of PIL that has been evolving and legalising rapidly 
and has been very successful.4 Over the past fifteen years, we have seen an 
ongoing surge in the conclusion of bilateral investment treaties (BITs)5 in 
absolute terms – though with a decline in relative terms since 1996 – as well as a 
surge in international arbitration of investment disputes at around the same time.6 
—————————————————— 
1 For example, in the realist tradition in PIL and lately also in the Law and Economics 
tradition. See J.L. Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2005); for a review of the latter, see A. van Aaken, ‘To Do Away with 
International Law? Some Limits to “The Limits of International Law”’, 17 EJIL (2006) p. 289. 
2 For example, B. Koremenos, et al., ‘The Rational Design of International Institutions’, 55 
International Organization (2001) p. 761. 
3 Effectiveness and compliance are different but related notions. Determining whether a 
State complies with a treaty requires comparing the relevant State’s activity with the treaty’s 
requirements. Effectiveness is directly related to – but distinct from – compliance and relates to 
causality. A State may comply with a treaty, that is to say, its actions may comport with the 
requirements of the treaty, but the treaty may nonetheless be ineffective in changing that State’s 
practices. On these notions, see A.T. Guzman, ‘A Compliance-Based Theory of International 
Law’, 90 California Law Review (2002) p. 1823; on compliance theories, see H.H. Koh, ‘Why 
do Nations Obey International Law?’, 106 Yale Law Journal (1997) p. 2599; and L.R. Helfer 
and A.-M. Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’, 107 Yale 
Law Journal (1997) p. 273. 
4 By success I mean that the regime is used by the relevant actors, that is to say, States and 
foreign direct investors. 
5 From 1990 to 2004, there was a surge from less then 500 BITs to almost 2,500 BITs, see 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report (New York/Geneva, United Nations 2006) at pp. 26 and 
29. If investment chapters of regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA, are included, there is 
even more treaty-making activity in the investment protection area (p. 28). 
6 UNCTAD, supra n. 5. 
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From an international lawyer’s perspective, this is a perfect development. But this 
may only be true at first sight. If substantive rules or review mechanisms place 
too much of a constraint on sovereignty, this might precipitate a backlash by 
governments. If so, when are those counter-reactions likely to occur and how can 
they be avoided?7 
 According to economic contract theory, BITs may be interpreted as a mecha-
nism for overcoming commitment problems between the investor and the host 
State in order to generate mutual benefits. A State promises not to infringe on the 
property rights of foreign direct investors in order to attract more investment and 
ultimately foster development. States thereby trade credibility for sovereignty, as 
international investment law restricts the regulatory conduct of States to an 
unusual extent, subject to control through compulsory international adjudication.8 
A well-known problem in contract theory is how to deal with uncertainty.9 Parties 
cannot easily design contracts that maximise jointly beneficial investments and at 
the same time respond appropriately to changing conditions ex post. Thus, a 
trade-off arises between ex ante strong commitment devices, on the one hand, and 
flexibility ex post in order to uphold the efficiency of the contract, on the other 
hand. But changing conditions are a prevalent characteristic in investment law. 
Contract theory finds that excessively strict and inflexible contracts may impair 
the joint surplus of the contracting parties. A problem one can identify is that, 
over the last years, the costs of BITs for States have been increasing, primarily 
due to progressive interpretation by international arbitral tribunals, granting little 
flexibility ex post. Hence, a trade-off may be identified. On the one hand, existing 
BITs are made more powerful in protecting investments due to progressive 
interpretation by international arbitral tribunals (thereby mitigating the commit-
ment problem). On the other hand, this development might endanger the future of 
BITs and thereby the protection of foreign direct investment (FDI) due to high 
sovereignty costs. In the language of mechanism design, investment protection 
—————————————————— 
7 For similar research on international human rights treaties, see L.R. Helfer, ‘Overlegaliz-
ing Human Rights: International Relations Theory and the Commonwealth Caribbean Backlash 
Against Human Rights Regimes’, 102 Columbia Law Review (2002) p. 1832. 
8 G. van Harten and M. Loughlin, ‘Investment Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global 
Administrative Law’, 17 EJIL (2006) p. 121, who draw an analogy with domestic administra-
tive law rather than international commercial arbitration, since investment arbitration engages 
disputes arising from the exercise of public authority by the State as opposed to private acts of 
the State. This analogy is also supported in Separate Opinion of T. Wälde in International 
Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. Mexico, NAFTA by UNCITRAL Rules (26 January 2006) 
paras. 13, 27, 129 and 139. 
9 For a thorough treatment of uncertainty in international relations, especially concerning 
the capacity of States to implement international treaties in internal policies, see G.W. Downs 
and D.M. Rocke, Optimal Imperfection? Domestic Uncertainty and Institutions in International 
Relations (Princeton, Princeton University Press 1995); for uncertainty in contracts as applied 
to international law, see R.E. Scott and P.B. Stephan, The Limits of Leviathan. Contract Theory 
and the Enforcement of International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2006). 
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lawyers sometimes seem to overlook the participation constraints on States. States 
can and already do react to this trade-off in various ways if they think that the 
pendulum has swung too far. It is hypothesised that ‘overprotection’ of foreign 
investment may lead to reactions that in the long run will weaken investment 
protection. In other words, international investment law has possibly passed a 
threshold of protection for foreign direct investors that endangers the system as a 
whole and may therefore lead to the ultimately undesired result of less protection 
for FDI in the long run. 
 This paper is organised as follows. First, section 2 provides a short overview 
on the functioning of international investment law. Section 3 takes a brief look at 
the success of international investment law and the empirical evidence of the 
impact of BITs on FDI. Section 4 sketches the economic logic of BITs, drawing 
on rational choice theory, especially economic contract theory applied to interna-
tional relations. Section 5 deals with the peril of success and the possible 
reactions of States. The final section concludes by presenting some suggestions 
on how the perils may be mitigated. 
 
 
2. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW: AN OVERVIEW 
 
Whereas international trade in goods and services is mainly governed by the 
WTO Agreement and its Annexes, there is no international legal equivalent for 
the governance of international investment, which constitutes a big part of 
international capital flows.10 So far, several attempts to draft an international 
agreement have failed. Most recently, the Draft Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, negotiated under the auspices of the OECD, failed spectacularly in 
1998.11 Likewise, the attempt to negotiate this topic under WTO auspices failed 
for the time being when the so-called ‘Singapore issue’ of investment was taken 
off the negotiating agenda of the Doha Round in the summer of 2004.12 Thus, 
—————————————————— 
10  From 1982 to 2005, FDI outward stock increased from USD 600 billion to 10,672 bil-
lion, thereby outpacing the increase in trade. See UNCTAD, supra n. 5, Table I.2. 
11  In 1995, OECD ministers launched negotiations on a multilateral agreement on invest-
ment (MAI) that had high standards of liberalisation and investment protection, effective 
dispute settlement procedures, and was open to non-members. Negotiations were discontinued 
in April 1998 and will not be resumed. For the negotiating history and reasons for failure, see 
R. Geiger, ‘Towards a Multilateral Agreement on Investment’, 31 Cornell International Law 
Journal (1998) p. 467. For the text of the draft, see: <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/46/40/ 
1895712.pdf>. 
12  At the 1996 Singapore Ministerial Conference, ministers from WTO member countries 
decided to set up new working groups on: trade and investment, competition policy, transpar-
ency in government procurement and trade facilitation. These four subjects were originally 
included on the Doha Development Agenda. The carefully negotiated mandate was for 
negotiations to start after the 2003 Cancún Ministerial Conference, ‘on the basis of a decision 
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there are no encompassing multilateral legal rules for foreign direct investment. 
The legal protection of foreign property nevertheless has a long history,13 with 
customary international law (CIL) protecting foreigners, including investors, by 
means of the so-called ‘minimum standard of treatment’14 and compensation 
requirements for expropriations.15 But this protection – nomen est omen – is only 
minimal and does not live up to the modern requirements of protection, as the 
interference with property rights is much more refined nowadays. Most conten-
tious issues deal not with outright expropriation but rather with regulatory 
expropriation or unfair treatment and disputes over contractual rights elevated to 
international law claims. 
 Nonetheless, this does not mean that foreign investment is legally unprotected 
– on the contrary. Since the conclusion of the first BIT between Germany and 
Pakistan in 1959, foreign investment is governed ever more by BITs as well as by 
bilateral or regional free trade agreements (FTAs) that include chapters on 
investment protection, such as NAFTA.16 
—————————————————— 
to be taken, by explicit consensus, at that session on modalities of negotiations’. There was no 
consensus, and the members agreed on 1 August 2004 to drop the issues (except for trade 
facilitation) from the Doha Agenda. 
13  For an overview, see A.F. Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2002) at pp. 391-414. 
14  For a discussion of the CIL character of protective norms in BITs, see B. Kishoiyian, 
‘The Utility of Bilateral Investment Treaties in the Formulation of Customary International 
Law’, 14 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business (1994) p. 327; A. Al 
Faruque, ‘Creating Customary International Law through Bilateral Investment Treaties: A 
Critical Appraisal’, 44 Indian Journal of International Law (2004) p. 292, both arguing against 
the formation of CIL through BITs; see also M.C. Porterfield, ‘An International Common Law 
of Investors Rights?’, 27 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law 
(2006) p. 79, arguing against the acceptance of even the minimum standard of treatment as a 
CIL norm due to its vagueness. For arguments in favour of the formation of CIL through BITs, 
see S. Hindelang, ‘Bilateral Investment Treaties, Custom and a Healthy Investment Climate – 
The Question of Whether BITs Influence Customary International Law Revisited’, 5 Journal of 
World Investment and Trade (2004) p. 789; S. Schwebel, ‘The Influence of Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaties on Customary International Law’, Proceedings of the American Society of 
International Law (2004) p. 27. 
15  The so-called Hull rule, which called for prompt, adequate and effective compensation in 
the case of expropriation. This rule lost its customary law character due to several UN General 
Assembly resolutions in the 1960s and 1970s. See, e.g., Art. 2 of Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States, GA Res. 3281 (XXIX), UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (1974) 50. 
Nevertheless, this kind of compensation requirement is now to be found in the BITs. For details 
and an economic explanation for the apparently paradoxical behaviour of developing countries, 
see A.T. Guzman, ‘Why LDCs Sign Treaties That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of 
Bilateral Treaties’, 38 Virginia Journal of International Law (1998) p. 639. 
16  NAFTA, Chapter 11. Others are the Colonia Protocol of 1994 as annexed to the Mercado 
Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) Agreement of 1991, which was not ratified by any Member 
State of MERCOSUR, and the Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area (1998, 
amended 2001). The present article focuses only on BITs, but a similar reasoning applies to 
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 Most BITs and investment chapters in trade agreements usually have similar 
substantive provisions.17 They include the definition of the scope of application, 
that is to say, a definition of what constitutes an investment and who counts as a 
foreign investor. The definition of investment tends to be asset-based.18 and is thus 
very broad. Asset-based definitions usually include all tangible and intangible 
assets, debt, contractual claims and intellectual property rights, including, for 
example, promissory notes or bank loans. This broad definition thus differs from 
the classical definition of FDI, which usually requires a long-term investment 
controlled by a foreigner who assumes a certain risk. The definition of ‘investor’ 
is also broad. Whereas for natural persons the nationality requirement is usually 
uncontested, determining the nationality of a legal person might be more difficult, 
as it can be defined by its place of incorporation, by its seat or by the control of 
the owners. BITs vary in their definitions and may use these requirements 
cumulatively.19 The rights of minority investors are usually included in the 
protection of BITs independently of the rights of the company itself.20 
 In addition, BITs contain general standards of treatment. They provide protec-
tion against direct and indirect (also ‘creeping’ or ‘tantamount to’) expropriation,21 
—————————————————— 
those trade agreements. The reasoning might not be exactly the same, as the trade agreements 
link issues and thereby generate different incentives and participation constraints. See section 4 
of this article. 
17  For an overview of BITs, see R. Dolzer and M. Stevens, Bilateral Investment Treaties 
(The Hague, Nijhoff 1995). 
18  For an overview of the definitions, see UNCTAD, UNCTAD Series on Issues in Interna-
tional Investment Agreements. Scope and Definition (2003), available at: <http://www.unctad. 
org/Templates/webflyer.asp?docid=189&intItemID=1772&lang=1>. On the notion of invest-
ment, see also N. Rubins, ‘The Notion of “Investment” in International Investment Arbitration’, 
in N. Horn, ed., Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes (The Hague, Kluwer 2004) p. 283. 
19  Cf., R. Wisner and N. Gallus, ‘Nationality Requirements in Investor-State Arbitration’, 5 
Journal of World Investment and Trade (2004) p. 927; K.E. Lyons, ‘Piercing the Corporate 
Veil in the International Arena’, 33 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Com. (2006) p. 523; P. Acconci, 
‘Determining the Internationally Relevant Link between a State and a Corporate Investor’, 5 
Journal of World Investment and Trade (2004) p. 139. 
20  This is now established case law, see, e.g., GAMI Investments, Inc. v. Mexico, NAFTA 
by UNCITRAL Rules (15 November 2004), at paras. 26-42, in which the investor had 14.18 
per cent; as well as CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Republic of Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/8, decision on jurisdiction (17 July 2003). For an overview, see S.A. Alexandrov, 
‘The “Baby Boom” of Treaty-Based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals: 
Shareholders as “Investors” and Jurisdiction Ratione Temporis’, 4 The Law and Practice of 
International Courts and Tribunals (2005) p. 19. 
21  Cf., B. Kunoy, ‘Developments in Indirect Expropriation Case Law in ICSID Transna-
tional Arbitration’, 6 Journal of World Investment and Trade (2005) p. 467; C. Yannaca-Small, 
‘Indirect Expropriation’ and the ‘Right to Regulate’ in International Investment Law, OECD 
Working Papers in International Investment No. 2004/4 (2004); R. Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropria-
tions: New Developments?’, 11 New York University Environmental Law Journal (2002) p. 64; 
V. Been and J.C. Beauvais, ‘The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA’s Investment Protections 
and the Misguided Quest for an International “Regulatory Takings” Doctrine’, 78 New York 
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require fair and equitable treatment.22 of the investor, provide for national treat-
ment and often contain a most-favoured-nation clause (MFN). They also might 
contain a so-called ‘umbrella clause’, which is a general promise to honour the 
obligations that the States entered into with the foreign investor, which are 
usually contractual agreements, such as licences or concession agreements.23 The 
umbrella clause may elevate contractual claims to international law claims and is 
therefore quite contested. 
 Last but not least, almost all treaties provide for international dispute settle-
ment in which States waive their immunity from suit. The establishment of a 
private course of action with the possibility of obtaining damages for an interna-
tional wrong transforms the context of international economic law by changing 
the incentive structure of the actors involved. The system is unique in PIL in that 
it gives investors ius standi to take disputes to international tribunals directly, 
mostly without exhaustion of local remedies.24 These international dispute 
settlement forums allow for the circumvention of national courts, which may 
—————————————————— 
University Law Review (2003) p. 30; M. Brunetti, ‘Indirect Expropriation in International Law’, 
5 International Law FORUM du droit international (2003) p. 150; R. Dolzer and F. Bloch, 
‘Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?’, 5 International Law FORUM du droit 
international (2003) p. 155; L.Y. Fortier and S.L. Drymer, ‘Indirect Expropriation in the Law 
of International Investment: I Know It When I See It, or Caveat Investor’, 19 ICSID Review 
(2004) p. 293; A.P. Newcombe, ‘The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International 
Law’, 20 ICSID Review (2005) p. 1. 
22  Cf., C. Schreuer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treatment in Arbitral Practice’, 6 Journal of World 
Investment and Trade (2005) p. 357; S. Vasciannie, ‘The Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Standard in International Investment Law and Practice’, 70 BYIL (2000) p. 99; C. Yannaca-
Small, Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard in International Investment Law, OECD 
Working Papers in International Investment No. 2004/3 (2004); B. Choudhury, ‘Evolution or 
Devolution? Defining Fair and Equitable Treatment in International Investment Law’, 6 
Journal of World Investment and Trade (2005) p. 297; R. Dolzer, ‘Fair and Equitable Treat-
ment: A Key Standard in Investment Treaties’, 39 International Lawyer (2005) p. 87; S. Schill, 
‘Fair and Equitable Treatment under Investment Treaties as an Embodiment of the Rule of 
Law’, 3 Transnational Dispute Management (2006) (online journal). 
23  See S.A. Alexandrov, ‘Breaches of Contract and Breaches of Treaty – The Jurisdiction 
of Treaty-Based Arbitration Tribunals to Decide Breach of Contract Claims in SGS v Pakistan 
and SGS v Philippines’, 5 Journal of World Investment and Trade (2004) p. 555; C. Schreuer, 
‘Travelling the BIT Route – Of Waiting Periods, Umbrella Clauses and Forks in the Road’, 5 
Journal of World Investment and Trade (2004) p. 231; A.C. Sinclair, ‘The Origins of the 
Umbrella Clause in the International Law of Investment Protection’, 20 Arbitration Interna-
tional (2004) p. 411; T. Wälde, ‘The “Umbrella” Clause in Investment Arbitration: A Comment 
on Original Intentions and Recent Cases’, 6 Journal of World Investment and Trade (2005) p. 
183; B. Kunoy, ‘Singing in the Rain: Developments in the Interpretation of Umbrella Clauses’, 
7 Journal of World Investment and Trade (2006) p. 275. 
24  Most BITs have some kind of waiting period for negotiation and require a very short 
period of time in which national courts need to decide (e.g., three or six months). This makes 
the latter requirement inapplicable de facto as court procedures usually take much longer than 
that, even in developed countries. 
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either be dependent on government and/or might show a home bias or have 
excessively long adjudication periods. International investment law acquires 
immense force through this provision, as private (legal) persons are much more 
likely to take up their own cases. Under the former system, governments had 
discretion whether they wanted to grant diplomatic protection to their nationals 
(as is the case under WTO). That weakened investor protection, as States follow 
their own (diplomatic and political) calculations and might have well-considered 
reasons why not to take a case to an international court or tribunal even if their 
own nationals are concerned. 
 The principal forum chosen for investment arbitration is the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID),25 but arbitration also takes 
place under other rules, for example the UNCITRAL or ICC rules. The ICSID 
Convention was created in 1965 under World Bank auspices with the goal of 
fostering private capital flows to developing countries. Whereas there is no 
uniform text of international investment protection and no sitting judicial body, as 
in the case of the Appellate Body of the WTO, there is nevertheless a corpus of 
fairly similar substantive provisions and an international arbitration mechanism 
for investment, even though the composition of the tribunals varies from case to 
case and the interpretations of the tribunals (of similar and even equal clauses) 
may also vary. Many of the indeterminate and vague legal terms found in BITs 
have only recently been clarified by the decisions of international investment 
tribunals, although many of the interpretations are highly disputed, for example 
the jurisdictional question on the nationality of investors. Similarly, the meaning 
of indirect expropriation and what constitutes a violation of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard, the ‘umbrella clause’ or the MFN clause are highly contested, 
thereby creating legal insecurity for investors and States. 
 
 
3. THE SUCCESS OF INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT LAW 
 
As alluded to before, the success of international investment law during the past 
fifteen years has been phenomenal.26 Not only have we seen a proliferation of 
BITs, but the system is also used by the relevant actors, that is to say, the States 
—————————————————— 
25  Based on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
the Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), 18 March 1965, 575 UNTS p. 159. For an 
overview of ICSID arbitration, including its advantages and disadvantages, see L. Reed, et al., 
Guide to ICSID Arbitration (The Hague, Kluwer 2004); as well as C. Schreuer, The ICSID 
Convention: A Commentary on the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Between States and Nationals of Other States (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2001). 
26  For a similar view, see B. Simmons, et al., Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960-2000, U. of St. Gallen Law & Economics Working Paper 
No. 2007-21 (2007) and University of Illinois Law Review (2008, forthcoming). 
The Case of International Investment Protection 9
and the investors that make ever more use of international arbitration by relying 
on the provisions of BITs. Even though around 2,500 BITs have so far been 
concluded, though not all have been ratified, one would need 11,175 BITs (based 
on the 150 WTO Member States) in order to achieve a worldwide protection of 
investments that is similar to the inclusiveness of WTO. Whereas the first BITs 
were concluded between developed and developing countries, an increasing 
number of BITs and FTAs are now concluded between developing countries.27 
Nevertheless, one can note a relative decline in the conclusion of BITs, with a 
peak in the middle of the 1990s. Although the number of FTAs is surging, and 
some of them contain investment chapters, this does not offset the relative decline 
found in the conclusion of BITs.28 The decline does not seem to be attributable to 
saturation, as investment flows are not confined to just a few countries. If BITs 
are to be seen as a potential marketing instrument by States, this marketing should 
reach all possible investors (and therefore countries). This decline has occurred 
simultaneously with a surge in international arbitration based on BITs during the 
last fifteen years. Known investment treaty arbitrations surged from almost zero 
in 1994 to almost 250 in 2006, most of the cases being conducted under ICSID.29 
Thus, whereas the conclusion of BITs peaked in the mid-1990s and has since then 
been in relative decline, disputes arising out of these BITs are on a continuous 
surge. 
 But that is only one way to look at success, of course. The other one is the 
question whether BITs really do foster foreign direct investment. If they do not, 
there would be no reason for States to trade off (regulatory) sovereignty against 
credibility and investment. In contract theory terms, there would be no positive 
pay-off for States if BITs did not foster investment. The empirical evidence has 
been inconclusive, though it now tilts slightly towards finding a positive relation-
ship between BITs and FDI. Whereas Hallward-Driemeier finds no significant 
—————————————————— 
27  UNCTAD, supra n. 5. 
28  UNCTAD, supra n. 5, compare Figures I.10 and I. 14 and p. 28. Until 2006, a total of 
less than 250 international treaties with investment protection that were not BITs, such as 
FTAs, had been concluded. Between 2001 and 2005, around 100 such treaties were concluded. 
See also UNCTAD, ‘Investment Provisions in Economic Integration Agreements’ (Ge-
neva/New York, UNCTAD 2006). 
29  See UNCTAD, Latest Developments in Investor-State Dispute Settlement, IIA 
MONITOR No. 4 (Geneva/New York, UNCTAD 2006) p. 2. The ICISD websites registers 133 
concluded cases (not all of them concluded by arbitration) and 116 pending cases as of 8 
September 2007, see: <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/cases.htm>. Not all arbitrations 
are known, for example, if they are conducted under UNCITRAL. At least seventy govern-
ments – forty-four of them in the developing world, fourteen in developed countries and twelve 
in Southeast Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States – have faced investment 
treaty arbitration. Argentina, Mexico, the United States and the Czech Republic have found 
themselves in the role of the defendant most often. 
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effect of BITs on FDI,30 Tobin and Rose-Ackerman find that the relationship 
between FDI and BITs is weak with a slightly more positive effect at high levels 
of country risk,31 and in a newer study confirm a positive relationship.32 Salacuse 
and Sullivan find that stricter BITs increase FDI, whereas less strict BITs have no 
significant effect. They compare US BITs with BITs from other OECD countries, 
which are indeed less strict for a variety of reasons, for example, admission of 
investment as well as the prohibition of performance requirements.33 The newest 
and most extensive and reliable study was carried out by Neumayer and Spees. 
They find an overall positive and significant effect of BITs on FDI.34 In short, 
BITs matter, at least on the margin, and do what they are supposed to do, namely 
fostering foreign direct investment, all other things being equal. Of course, that 
does not mean that other factors such as market size, market potential and natural 
resources may not be more important as a decision factor for enterprises.35 
 
 
4. THE ECONOMIC LOGIC OF BITS 
 
In order to understand the underlying logic of BITs, this article draws on eco-
nomic contract theory, assuming that States (as well as enterprises) act rationally 
when concluding treaties. Traditionally, the legal analysis of contracts takes an ex 
post perspective, that is to say, it focuses on rights and obligations after there has 
been an alleged breach as well as on the recovery of losses for the injured party. 
Contract theory shifts the focus to the ex ante decision to why and under what 
circumstances parties enter into the contract in the first place, thus acknowledging 
the consensual approach as well as the participation constraints on parties. 
—————————————————— 
30  M. Hallward-Driemeier, Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Attract FDI?: Only a Bit… 
and They Could Bite, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. WPS 312 (2003). 
31  J. Tobin and S. Rose-Ackerman, Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environ-
ment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment Treaties, Yale Law & 
Economics Research Paper No. 293 (2005). 
32  J. Tobin and S. Rose-Ackerman, ‘When BITs Have Some Bite: The Political-Economic 
Environment for Bilateral Investment Treaties’ (2006), available at: <http://www.law.yale.edu/ 
documents/pdf/When_BITs_Have_Some_Bite.doc>. 
33  J.W. Salacuse and N.P. Sullivan, ‘Do BITs Really Work? An Evaluation of Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties and their Grand Bargain’, 46 Harvard International Law Journal (2005) p. 67. 
34  E. Neumayer and L. Spees, ‘Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct 
Investment to Developing Countries?’, 33 World Development (2005) p. 1567, who have data 
from 119 countries and look at the period from 1970 to 2001. T. Büthe and H.V. Milner, The 
Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through 
Policy Commitment Via Trade Agreements and Investment Treaties?, Working Paper (2005), 
available at: <http://polisci.ucsd.edu/calendar/ButheMilner_FDI_24mar05.pdf>, who also find 
a positive relationship. 
35  Brazil, for example, has not ratified any BIT and is nevertheless the biggest recipient 
country of FDI in Latin America after Mexico. UNCTAD, supra n. 5. 
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Contract theory is primarily an analytical approach for explaining why parties 
contract in the first place and why they write the contracts they do in light of what 
courts do. It also helps to answer questions of optimal contracting. Though 
contract theory was developed mainly for individual contracting and not for 
international law, it has now also been applied to international relations.36 
 Enforceable contracts are a mechanism for achieving compliance with 
cooperative goals that are supposed to benefit the collective interest (or joint 
surplus) of parties whose particular interests may diverge at a given time. In 
investment law, the structure is more complicated than in normal private law 
contracts because the concluding parties (States) give rights to third parties 
(investors). Nevertheless, contract theory also promises some insights into 
optimal contracting. 
 One general problem in contract theory is how to deal with uncertainty and 
incomplete contracting, as the future (including the behaviour of the other party) 
is unknown and unknowable. Contract theory analyses problems of adverse 
selection, moral hazard and verification. At the heart of those problems are 
information asymmetries between the parties: each party has information about 
itself (private information) that the other does not. This gives rise to adverse 
selection (i.e., high-quality parties might be driven out of the market)37 and moral 
hazard, as well as to the problem of verifying hidden actions to a third party (i.e., 
investment tribunals).38 Complete contracts that foresee every contingency are 
impossible to draft and even trying to come close to this creates high negotiating 
costs. That in turn gives rise to the impossibility to foresee and describe appropri-
ately the contractual outcome for all states of the future world: ‘Contracts will be 
incomplete in the sense that they will fail to discriminate between states of the 
world that optimally call for different obligation.’39 Parties entering into contracts 
usually face a problem. The contract should be optimal from an ex ante perspec-
tive, that is to say, it should encourage the parties at the time of the conclusion of 
the contract to invest in the contractual relationship so as to maximise the 
anticipated joint benefits. At the same time, however, parties want to write a 
—————————————————— 
36  Scott and Stephan, supra n. 9. The following part draws heavily on their analysis, espe-
cially chapter 3. 
37  See, generally, G.A. Akerlof, ‘The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the 
Market Mechanism’, 84 Quarterly Journal of Economics (1970) p. 488, who illustrates the 
problem with the market for used cars (lemons). The problem is caused by the adverse selection 
of low quality sellers. In investment law, this problem can be mitigated for ‘lemon’ investors by 
admission procedures, as practiced by Australia, for example. 
38  Contract theorists distinguish between observable and verifiable information. The former 
can be observed by the two parties, but it may still be that the information is not verifiable in 
the sense that the observing party is unable to establish the fact sufficiently to convince a 
neutral third party, for example the investment tribunal, at reasonable cost. See for details Scott 
and Stephan, supra n. 9, at p. 71 et seq. 
39  Scott and Stephan, supra n. 9, at p. 76. 
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contract that is ‘optimal ex post, that is, a contract that is still value maximizing 
after all future uncertainties have been resolved as of the time of performance.’40 
Those two partially conflicting goals create an inherent tension, as ex ante each 
party would like to ensure the commitment of the other, but subsequent events 
may render inflexible commitments inconsistent with the contractual objective of 
maximising the joint surplus. This problem becomes acute in long-term contracts 
such as BITs but also in State contracts, for example in natural resource or public 
utility concessions, which often have durations of more than twenty-five years, 
especially if covered by umbrella clauses. ‘Unforeseen circumstances may cause 
the cost to one of the parties to complete a promised investment to exceed the 
value that the counterparty expected to generate from the contract.’41 For host 
States, those costs may not only be economic but also political.42 
 As is well acknowledged in contract theory, the advantage of writing a 
contract with ‘hard’ and precise terms is the ensurance of credible commitments. 
But unless the parties can ‘fully and accurately anticipate the conditions that exist 
at the time of performance, a contract containing only “hard” terms will always 
turn out to be suboptimal once the future arrives. […] In short: once conditions 
change, a contract with hard terms will lead to outcomes that are less desirable 
than those the parties would have agreed to had they known the uncertainties in 
advance.’43 Anticipating this, the parties would then want flexibility to adjust the 
investment whenever future circumstances make the investment no longer 
profitable (for either side). More flexibility in turn leads to a weakening of the 
credibility of the parties. There is thus a trade-off in contracting with regard to the 
credibility of a commitment, on the one hand, and the desired ex post flexibility, 
on the other. 
 Parties might thus choose to express their obligations in more general terms 
and delegate the interpretation to third parties in order to account for the neces-
sary ex post flexibility. The crucial criterion in contract theory is whether 
appropriate proxies for the contested circumstances can be specified ex ante or 
whether a disinterested third party can be trusted to make such a selection ex post 
with the benefit of the hindsight. Contract theory therefore distinguishes between 
precise and vague terms (or ‘rules v. standards’ or ‘hard v. soft norms’), with 
standards delegating more discretion to courts and tribunals, though it might be 
that standards are reserved for self-judgment (e.g., essential security clauses in 
Art. XXI GATT) in cases where private information is very difficult to verify. 
Usually, a combination of both is found. 
—————————————————— 
40  Scott and Stephan, supra n. 9, at p. 61. 
41  Scott and Stephan, supra n. 9. 
42  As, for example, in Argentina’s economic and political crisis of 2000-2001 or the public 
unrest behind the case Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, decision on 
jurisdiction (21 October 2005). 
43  Scott and Stephan, supra n. 9, at p. 77. 
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 Let us now turn to investment law more specifically. Undisputedly, countries, 
especially developing countries, have a strong incentive to attract FDI and 
compete for it.44 The fundamental problem for countries is to make the protection 
more credible.45 As the potential host State can promise ex ante to honour the 
property right of the investor, the State may renege on its promises ex post if there 
is no sanction. Firms cannot usually disinvest in full once they have placed a 
fixed investment, as those investments are usually relation-specific. There is thus 
a hold-up problem. Once one party, in investment law, the investor, has under-
taken such an investment, it becomes vulnerable to exploitation if the other party, 
the host State, fails to reciprocate fully. States can take advantage of this in 
several ways, for example by increasing taxes (even though they might have 
promised a preferential tax regime to the investor), by changing the royalty 
division in case of natural resources extraction.46 or by prohibiting the augmenta-
tion of prices in cases of privatised utilities.47 The host State will do so if the net 
benefits of reneging on its promise are greater than the net benefits of complying 
with its promise. As firms anticipate a possible later expropriation or unfair 
treatment, they may refrain from investment, leading to the socially undesired 
result of less investment. 
 The solution to the problem is to make the commitment of the host State 
credible, and BITs do exactly that. States give a reciprocal promise to treat the 
nationals of the other State in a certain manner. BITs are international law treaties 
giving protection to private persons or firms, thus creating a de facto regime of 
State liability for regulation.48 Investment protection thus becomes an instrument 
to attract scarce resources by reducing the risk of ex post opportunism on the part 
of host countries. BITs place host States under a credible threat if they renege on 
their international law promises (i.e., BITs) or their promises in national law State 
contracts (e.g., concession agreements) if there is an umbrella clause. The 
commitment is made especially forceful by third-party adjudication. 
—————————————————— 
44  See Simmons, et al., supra n. 26; Guzman, supra n. 15. 
45  This certainly applies to States that do not have strong property rights protection in 
national law, which in turn leads to the problem that their capacity may not be able to live up to 
the ‘one size fits all’ provisions of BITs. Furthermore, ‘rule of law’ States such as the United 
States have been defendants in many cases. 
46  This is currently a serious problem for foreign oil companies in Venezuela. 
47  For example, Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, decision on juris-
diction (21 October 2005) (water utility); CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine 
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (12 May 2005) (energy transport utility); and recently 
Compañiá de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3 (20 August 2007) (water utility). 
48  For a similar reasoning in the NAFTA Chapter 11 context, see A. Afilalo, ‘Constitution-
alization through the Back Door: A European Perspective on NAFTA’s Investment Chapter’, 
34 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics (2001) p. 1 at p. 6. 
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 By creating this system, the pay-off for the host States is changed through 
sanctions. Direct sanctions consist of damages that may be quite high for develop-
ing countries.49 ICSID decisions also have res iudicata effect.50 in all 144 Member 
States of the Convention, which means that the decisions can be executed in those 
countries where the host State has property (e.g., bank accounts) unless sovereign 
immunity comes into play. This makes reneging on the decision of an ICSID 
tribunal more difficult than non-compliance with decisions under, for example, 
the New York Convention,51 where national courts can review the international 
arbitral award and set it aside, for example for public policy reasons. ICSID 
arbitration therefore offers a much more secure dispute resolution mechanism for 
investors than other venues. Just as forceful are the indirect sanctions of the 
reputational effect of being an unreliable host State.52 The reputational effect can 
come into play not only with an award against the host State and/or non-
compliance with an award but also at an earlier stage, that is to say, when a case 
is published as pending on the ICSID website. At that stage, the host State may 
already lose its reputation and, thus, future investment. A bad (or good) reputation 
may be reversed by a new government that takes measures in order to seem more 
credible and attract investment (or reverses a favourable investment policy due to 
a change in government). 
 At first sight, economic logic tells us that BITs are an adequate mechanism for 
dealing with the commitment problem. Nevertheless, there is a downside to 
solving the commitment problem too strictly, namely an optimisation problem 
that I wish to outline here. The inefficiency caused by excessively inflexible 
contracting can also be found in investment law. In the case of PIL, Abbott and 
Snidal.53 identify two more variables in order to determine the ‘hardness’ of an 
international agreement: (1) obligation (O): how binding is the obligation?; (2) 
delegation (D): is there any central authority created for monitoring and adjudica-
tion?; and, lastly, the above-mentioned vagueness, that is to say, (3) precision (P): 
how precise is the obligation? International law is to be found on a continuum on 
a scale from ‘soft’ to ‘hard’ law. International investment law belongs in the 
—————————————————— 
49  Even though Argentina is an extreme case, it can expect over USD 20 billion in damages 
from around thirty-five pending cases, amounting to an annual budget for compensation for the 
emergency measures it took during the economic crisis of 2000-2001. 
50  The Member States recognise ICSID awards as national court decisions, that is to say, 
the awards have the formal imprimatur that they are binding and final, Art. 53(1) ICSID 
Convention. 
51  UN Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New 
York Convention), 10 June 1958, 330 UNTS p. 38, which presumes the validity of awards and 
mandates enforcement except for procedural grounds or public policy grounds. 
52  For an economic theory of compliance based on reputational effects, see Guzman, supra 
n. 3. See also Scott and Stephan, supra n. 9, at p. 68. 
53  K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’, 54 Inter-
national Organization (2000) p. 421. 
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corner of ‘hard law’, due to the creation of enforceable rights of investors and 
third-party adjudication, thereby creating credible commitments, except for the 
precision of the terms of BITs.54 
 In international investment law, contractual uncertainty has many facets: the 
uncertainty of opportunistic behaviour of States or firms; the uncertainty of 
States´ capacity to fulfil their international obligations through domestic regula-
tory policy;55 the uncertainty of the development of world market prices for 
natural resources, the uncertainty of how governments react to citizens´ reactions 
unfavourable to the investment in question; and so forth.56 Is a strict promise ex 
ante the only solution? In practice, large parts of international law are phrased in 
‘soft’ terms, allowing for adjustment to contingencies.57 In addition, BITs are 
drafted mostly in vague terms, thus delegating discretion to tribunals, though they 
are ‘hard’ law measured against the other criteria of Abbot and Snidal. This 
makes the interpretation of the tribunals crucial for the efficiency and ultimately 
the stability of the system. Contract theory assumes disinterested third-party 
adjudication; to my knowledge, no literature exists in contract theory on the 
question of potential conflicts of interest of courts or tribunals. It is, however, a 
known problem in investment arbitration. Some commentators diagnose a 
systemic problem of revolving doors between arbitrators and counsel.58 Further-
more, so-called ‘issue conflicts’59 may arise if the same person is at the same time 
both an arbitrator and counsel for an investor when the interpretation of the same 
substantive norm is in question (albeit in different proceedings). Certainly, a 
problem has arisen due to the wide discretion of international tribunals and the 
diversity in their interpretation of BITs. This is aggravated because most BITs 
—————————————————— 
54  From a contract theory point of view, see also Scott and Stephan, supra n. 9, p. 148, who 
distinguish between formal and informal enforcement mechanisms. Formal enforcement entails 
the possibility of standing of private parties before an independent tribunal that has the 
authority to impose sanctions. Investment law falls into this category. 
55  See Downs and Rocke, supra n. 9, at p. 105 et seq. 
56  Downs and Rocke, supra n. 9, see a clear danger of a gambling for resurrection in case 
of war, for example. In investment law, the danger is rather that the costs felt by excessively 
strict BITs are shifted by governments to later governments (and generations), whereas the 
gains are reaped immediately. 
57  Most generally, Art. 62 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969, 
1155 UNTS p. 331. 
58  T. Buergenthal, ‘The Proliferation of Disputes, Dispute Settlement Procedures and Re-
spect for the Rule of Law’, 3 Transnational Dispute Settlement (2006) (online journal) p. 6: 
‘These revolving-door problems – counsel selecting an arbitrator who, the next time around 
when the arbitrator is counsel, selects the previous counsel as arbitrator – should be avoided. 
Manus manum lavat, in other words “you scratch my back and I’ll scratch yours”, does not 
advance the rule of law.’ Arbitration Rule 6 of the new Arbitration rules of the ICSID 
Convention now indeed has stricter conflict of interest rules for arbitrators. 
59  J. Levine, ‘Dealing with Arbitrator “Issue Conflicts” in International Arbitration’, 3 
Transnational Dispute Management (2006) (online journal). 
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were concluded before the surge in arbitral decisions. It was difficult for States to 
predict judicial outcomes of disputes with any degree of certainty and thus also 
difficult for them to know how ‘hard’ their commitment was. Whereas some 
tribunals have been on the ‘flexibility’ side by deferring to the regulatory policy 
decisions of host States giving them a bigger margin of appreciation, others tend 
to interpret treaties based on a narrowly understood object and purpose of BITs, 
that is to say, investor protection. Ex post, the latter thus turn out to be a contract 
with ‘hard’ terms, which has a greater tendency to be inefficient from an ex post 
perspective. This in turn gives rise to the peril of success. 
 
5. THE PERIL OF SUCCESS 
 
Thus, one possible problem for States in investment law is the cost of (unfore-
seen) strict promises. Thus, a peril arises: the participation constraints on States.60 
Generally speaking, States will only participate in the system if the expected costs 
of constraining its (regulatory) sovereignty through BITs and State contracts will 
deliver expected (net) benefits. States may not like ‘hard law’ due to sovereignty 
costs, that is to say, costs that are created by the restriction of possible action. For 
example, certain regulatory measures cannot be taken or certain policies may not 
be allowed without due compensation (e.g., environmental measures, tax policy 
or certain economic or monetary policies). ‘Hard’ law can arise due to two facts: 
either the treaty is written as completely as possible, with strict promises by 
States, or it is written in vague terms and tribunals interpret the terms in a strict 
manner. Both of these possibilities are discussed below. 
 The obligation in the sense of Abbott and Snidal is high, if the ex ante explicit 
restriction of reaction possibilities to unforeseen circumstances is high (precise 
terms). Comparing investment law with trade law shows that there are usually no 
general exception clauses in BITs as there are in the WTO law (e.g., Art. XX 
GATT, Arts. XIV and XIVbis GATS or the Safeguards Agreement), although it is 
sometimes possible for a State to escape BIT obligations by taking measures for 
the ‘protection of its own essential security interests.’61 Here, the force of the 
—————————————————— 
60  This constraint is a notion of game theory, more specifically mechanism design. It is 
satisfied if a mechanism leaves all participants at least as well off as they would have been if 
they had not participated. Scott and Stephan, supra n. 9, at p. 28, somehow use the notion 
implicitly, drawing on classical contract theory, which uses as a crucial criterion of observable 
and verifiable conditions for the kind of enforcement chosen by States. 
61  The US BITs are an exception in this respect. Like earlier treaties, the Model BIT 2004 
contains such a clause in Art. 18: Essential Security: ‘Nothing in this Treaty shall be construed: 
1. to require a Party to furnish or allow access to any information the disclosure of which it 
determines to be contrary to its essential security interests; or 2. to preclude a Party from 
applying measures that it considers necessary for the fulfillment of its obligations with respect 
to the maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the protection of its own 
essential security interests.’ A similar approach can be found in Art. 24 of the Energy Charter 
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obligation depends largely on whether these escape clauses are self-judging or 
only subject to good faith scrutiny.62 This is usually denied by international 
tribunals, unless the clauses explicitly say so, even against the will of both State 
Parties to the relevant BIT,63 an interpretation that would need to justify why 
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) was 
not applied. The invocation of State necessity in a BIT and in customary interna-
tional law.64 by Argentina due to its economic crisis in 2000-2001 was not 
accepted by the majority of the tribunals,65 thus obligating Argentina to pay 
compensation for the tariff freeze it had imposed on public utilities and its 
devaluation of its currency.66 The costs of the obligations may thus be quite high, 
as a country may no longer be free to react to external or internal economic or 
—————————————————— 
Treaty, 17 December 1994, 33 ILM p. 381 (though it does not apply to direct or indirect 
expropriation). 
62  For a discussion of the case in the broader context of State necessity and investment 
protection, see A. van Aaken, ‘Zwischen Scylla und Charybdis: Völkerrechtlicher Staatsnot-
stand und Internationaler Investitionsschutz’, 105 Zeitschrift für vergleichende 
Rechtswissenschaft (2006) p. 544. 
63  The tribunal in CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/8 (12 May 2005) rejected this provision in the first Argentine crisis case. Even 
though it confirmed the applicability in economic crisis cases, it denied protection to Argentina 
on the grounds that there was no economic emergency (in contrast to the national emergency 
law of Argentina). It also held, contrary to the expert opinion of Prof. Slaughter, that there were 
no limits to the control of the tribunal in relation to this clause, that is to say, the tribunal did 
not defer to the assessment of the Argentine government and only controlled for obvious 
misuse (good faith limits), as national constitutional courts would usually do. In its Application 
for Annulment and Request for Stay of Enforcement of the Arbitral Award of 8 September 
2005, Argentina argued that the US State Department viewed such clauses as self-judging 
(para. 39). Thus, though both States involved argued for self-judgment, the tribunal did not 
agree. A similar reasoning was applied by the tribunal in LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital 
Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, 
decision on liability (3 October 2006). The tribunal also held that the escape clause was not 
self-judging and stated that the United States still held that these clauses were not self-judging 
when it concluded the BIT with Argentina and only later changed its position. 
64  As codified in Art. 25 of the ILC Draft on State Responsibility. 
65  CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8 (12 
May 2005); and Enron Corporation, Ponderosa Assets L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/3 (22 May 2007). The tribunal in LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and 
LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1, decision on 
liability (3 October 2006) found that Argentina indeed was in a state of necessity for a period of 
seventeen months. Argentina’s annulment application in the CMS case was unsuccessful in this 
respect, see Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the 
Argentine Republic of 25 September 2007. 
66  National investors did not get any compensation as their path to ICSID is barred. In total, 
3,783 petitions have been filed with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights 
regarding the Corralito measures (freezing of individual bank accounts), but as yet there is no 
decision. 
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political shocks and crises without paying compensation to foreign investors. This 
is presumably ex post inefficient. 
 Apart from these explicit escape clauses, there is another interpretational 
method of rendering investment law more flexible in the light of non-investment 
law in order to achieve harmonious interpretation between international legal 
obligations for States. Article 31(3)(c) VCLT allows for the consideration of other 
international treaties concluded between the parties.67 That is to say, international 
environmental treaties or human rights treaties may also be taken into account 
when determining the obligations of States, for example in the interpretation of 
indirect expropriation or fair and equitable treatment. In practice, however, this is 
not often done.68 
 Furthermore, States may not want to ratify BITs that restrict their sovereignty 
unpredictably. There is an informational problem for States as in time 1 host 
countries give promises that may lead to welfare losses in the future. Here, 
flexibility costs (a subset of sovereignty costs) arise, that is to say, States may not 
be able to act as they thought they could ex ante. Generally speaking, if precision 
is high and the promise is strict, then the flexibility costs, understood as sover-
eignty costs, may also be high. States may therefore prefer low precision ex ante, 
unless they feel that they can explicitly restrain certain protective norms without 
loss of credibility.69 But if precision is low, a problem arises through delegation 
and progressive interpretation.70 If States thought of giving a promise PA in time 1 
and find out in time 2 that they promised PB (with PB > PA.), they might, through a 
learning process, react in the light of the experiences. For example, countries may 
turn to less favourable promises or restrict the interpretational discretion of 
international tribunals if they think that the net benefit of credible commitment is 
turning negative. They might change the promise PA for the future by various 
means. 
—————————————————— 
67  See, extensively, C. MacLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systematic Integration and Art. 
31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention’, 54 ICLQ (2005) p. 279, who describes that interpretational 
method as the ‘master-key’ of constructing the large building of international law (p. 280 et 
seq.). 
68  For details, see A. van Aaken, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: The Case of Interna-
tional Investment Law’, Finnish Yearbook of International Law (2008, forthcoming). 
69  As, for example, in the new US Model BIT 2004, which considerably restricts the inter-
pretational discretion concerning indirect expropriation in Annex B: ‘Except in rare 
circumstances, nondiscriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, and the environment, 
do not constitute indirect expropriations.’ This is presumably a reaction to the extensive 
interpretation of ICSID tribunals. The same holds for the investment part of the Japan-
Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement, available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/ 
asia-paci/philippine/epa0609/main.pdf>, which includes several exceptions and safeguards 
concerning regulatory issues (see Art. 99 et seq.). 
70  It is debatable whether some of the interpretations are even praeter legem interpretations. 
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 Thus, if precision is low, flexibility costs depend crucially on the interpreta-
tion by the tribunal. In practice, we find quite progressive interpretation by ICSID 
tribunals.71 In the view of some tribunals, BITs are instruments for the maximisa-
tion of investor protection. Accordingly, uncertainties as to how to resolve 
ambiguous treaty provisions should be resolved in favour of foreign investors.72 
Lately, a few other arbitral tribunals or minority arbitrators have dismissed such 
an approach, calling instead for a more balanced interpretation that considers both 
the necessity to protect foreign investment and the State’s sovereign responsibility 
to provide for ‘an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development of 
economic activities’73 that gives a greater margin of appreciation to States.74 The 
United States, in a dispute concerning itself as a respondent, contended that ‘a 
doctrine of restrictive interpretation should be applied in investor-State disputes. 
In other words, wherever there is any ambiguity in clauses granting jurisdiction 
—————————————————— 
71  Progressive interpretation could be a function of arbitrators’ interests, but does not need 
not be. 
72  See, e.g., SGS Société Générale de Surveillance S.A. v. Republic of the Philippines, Case 
No. ARB/02/6 (29 January 2004) at para. 116: ‘It is legitimate to resolve uncertainties in its 
interpretation so as to favour the protection of covered investments.’ 
73  Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. Argentine Re-
public, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/13, decision on preliminary objections (27 July 2006) at para. 
99; and El Paso Energy International Company v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/15, decision on jurisdiction (27 April 2006) at para. 66 et seq. and para 70: ‘a balanced 
interpretation is needed, taking into account both State sovereignty and the State’s responsibil-
ity to create an adapted and evolutionary framework for the development of economic 
activities, and the necessity to protect foreign investment and its continuing flow’, thus 
rejecting a one-sided interpretation either in favour of foreign investors or in favour of host 
States. See also Noble Ventures, Inc. v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/11 (12 October 
2005) para. 52, concerning the teleological interpretation of an umbrella clause: ‘The object and 
purpose rule also supports such an interpretation. While it is not permissible, as is too often 
done regarding BITs, to interpret clauses exclusively in favour of investors, here such an 
interpretation is justified.’ 
74  For example, S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Government of Canada, NAFTA by UNCITRAL 
Rules, 1st Partial Award (13 November 2000) paras. 261 and 263; Saluka Investments B.V. v. 
Czech Republic, Partial Award (17 March 2006) para. 304 et seq. ‘This Tribunal would 
observe, however, that while it subscribes to the general thrust of these and similar statements 
[stability of the legal system of the host State – AvA], it may be that, if their terms were to be 
taken too literally, they would impose upon host States’ obligations which would be inappro-
priate and unrealistic. Moreover, the scope of the Treaty’s protection of foreign investment 
against unfair and inequitable treatment cannot exclusively be determined by foreign investors’ 
subjective motivations and considerations. Their expectations, in order for them to be protected, 
must rise to the level of legitimacy and reasonableness in light of the circumstances. 305. No 
investor may reasonably expect that the circumstances prevailing at the time the investment is 
made remain totally unchanged. In order to determine whether frustration of the foreign 
investor’s expectations was justified and reasonable, the host State’s legitimate right subse-
quently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest must be taken into consideration as 
well.’ 
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over disputes concerning States and private persons, such ambiguity is always to 
be resolved in favour of maintaining State sovereignty’.75 
 Indeterminate legal terms, for example ‘fair and equitable treatment’ or 
indirect expropriation, have often been interpreted progressively and in a strict 
manner when the ‘legitimate expectations’ of the investor were the crucial 
criterion in determining a breach.76 
 Furthermore, the definition of investor in BITs has been a contentious issue, as 
it determines who can get the protection of a BIT and to whom the State’s 
promise was made. It may happen that the State faces an unexpected extension of 
the circle of promisees. Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine.77 was a dispute mounted under 
the Lithuania-Ukraine BIT, in which a group of Ukrainian investors had incorpo-
rated a legal entity in Lithuania and then used that entity to invest back into 
Ukraine in order to avail themselves of the protections promised to ‘Lithuanian’ 
investors by Ukraine under the BIT. The majority of the tribunal stated that the 
parties to a BIT were free to determine the criteria for nationality.78 and set the 
definition of investor and foreign control of a local entity for the purposes of 
Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention. In a rare occurrence, the president of 
an ICSID arbitral tribunal, Prosper Weil, dissented from this decision on jurisdic-
tion and signalled his concern for the ‘integrity’ of the ICSID system, as the 
interpretation of the majority would ultimately allow nationals to seek protection 
against their own State in international tribunals. That, in his opinion, would 
destabilise the system as such and go against international law principles. In 
Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia,79 the investors migrated the holding company of 
Aguas del Tunari from the Cayman Islands to Luxembourg, whose shares were in 
turn held by a newly established firm in the Netherlands, thereby using the 
Netherlands-Bolivian BIT in order to go to ICSID.80 The definition of the 
nationality of corporate entities is a long-known problem but is becoming ever 
more pressing in a more globalised world where firms have increasingly compli-
catedly structures. It is unclear whether tribunals accept or pierce the corporate 
veil. When they choose the latter, it is also unclear whether they stop at the first 
—————————————————— 
75  Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, NAFTA by UNCITRAL Rules, 1st Partial 
Award (7 August 2002) para. 103. 
76  For a discussion, see R. Dolzer, ‘Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?’, 11 New 
York University Environmental Law Journal (2002) p. 64. 
77  ICSID Case No. ARB/02/18, decision on jurisdiction (29 April 2004). Depending on the 
treaty provision on the nationality of a firm, this now allows a de facto coverage of domestic 
investors operating through a holding company incorporated in the other State party. 
78  Ibid., at para. 24. 
79  Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, decision on jurisdiction (21 
October 2005). 
80  The ultimate majority owner was Bechtel, a US-American firm. 
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level of shareholders, whether they look at the ultimate beneficiaries or whether 
they stop somewhere in between.81 
 A further unforeseen circumstance is the interpretation of the most-favoured-
nation (MFN) clause, a multilateralisation devise par excellence that allows 
investors to get the protection of any other BIT concluded by the host State if it is 
more favourable than the BIT between the host State and an investor’s home 
State. Whereas MFN clauses were originally only supposed to apply to substan-
tive issues, the ICSID tribunal decided in Maffezzini v. Spain.82 that the MFN 
clause also applies to procedural provisions.83 The possibility of BIT-shopping by 
enterprises is therefore a problem from the viewpoint of States. Investors may 
play opportunistically in cases of forum shopping possibilities (MFN and the 
nationality of investors). From the viewpoint of foreign investors, it is in each 
individual firm’s interest to play the BIT game opportunistically and try to go to 
ICSID in order to get a progressive interpretation of the BIT. For a group of 
investors, however, this may result in States making fewer ‘hard law’ promises, 
leading to less protection for firms. Investors therefore find themselves in a 
classical prisoners’ dilemma game. 
 A further contentious issue is the so-called ‘umbrella clause’. The interpreta-
tion debate over the concrete meaning of this – potentially powerful – provision 
found in many BITs has high stakes, as it decides on the applicable law as well as 
the forum of the dispute (national v. international). A broad interpretation of such 
clauses opens up the possibility to sue States under international law whenever a 
contractual commitment or undertaking has been breached by a State or a State 
agency without it being necessary to prove some other breach of the relevant 
—————————————————— 
81  See P. Acconci, ‘Determining the Internationally Relevant Link between a State and a 
Corporate Investor’, 5 Journal of World Investment and Trade (2004) p. 139; Wisner and 
Gallus, supra n. 19. 
82  Emilio Maffezzini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, decision on jurisdic-
tion (25 January 2000). 
83  The Maffezzini reasoning was recently followed by Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de 
Barcelona S.A., and InterAguas Servicios Integrales del Agua S.A. v. Argentina, ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/17, decision on jurisdiction (16 May 2006), at para. 52 et seq. It distinguished its 
reading from Plama Consortium Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/24, 
decision on jurisdiction (8 February 2005). For a more restrictive reasoning, see also 
SaliniCostruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/13, decision 
on jurisdiction (9 November 2004); Siemens v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/8, decision 
on jurisdiction (3 August 2004). Also, in a recently decided case, Telenor Mobile Communica-
tions AS v. Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/15, decision on jurisdiction (13 
September 2006) para. 95, the tribunal declined to grant the protection of the MFN clause to 
procedural issues, noting: ‘In these circumstances, to invoke the MFN clause to embrace the 
method of dispute resolution is to subvert the intention of the parties to the basic treaty, who 
have made it clear that this is not what they wish’. In the same vein, see Berschader & 
Berschader v. The Russian Federation, Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of 
Commerce; UNCTAD, supra n. 29. 
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treaty. Under this interpretation, the clause subsumes all contractual breaches 
under the umbrella of the treaty, thus obviating the need for foreign investors to 
rely on the dispute settlement provisions contained in the relevant State contract 
(e.g., local courts or other forms of arbitration). Nevertheless, tribunals have 
openly clashed over the meaning to be ascribed to such treaty clauses and the 
extent to which they may permit foreign investors to dispense with the dispute 
settlement provisions spelled out in contracts in favour of pursuing international 
arbitration under a treaty.84 
 The list could be continued, but the above suffices to demonstrate why States 
may react against this development. States may stay out of the game altogether by 
not signing or ratifying BITs. Indeed, we have seen a relative decline in the 
conclusion of BITs that is not offset by the conclusion of investment chapters in 
trade agreements. For example, the United States and the Southern African Cus-
toms Union (SACU) were negotiating a free trade agreement but broke off talks 
because SACU did not want to include a US proposal on investment liberalisation 
and protection provisions in the proposed free trade agreement.85 States may also 
restrict (in new BITs) the interpretational supremacy of international tribunals by 
including a general saving clause regarding interpretation. Some BITs and FTAs 
contain provisions that retain the ultimate competence for interpretation for States, 
for example NAFTA.86 The NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued a binding 
statement in 2001 concerning the interpretation of fair and equitable treatment.87 It 
held that this provision only amounts to minimum standards of treatment and that it 
does not contain any transparency requirements for States, thereby cutting back the 
progressive interpretation of international arbitral tribunals. Very few BITs or FTAs 
retain this binding interpretational competence for States,88 which means that this 
—————————————————— 
84  The El Paso ruling, supra n. 73, is very instructive in this regard. 
85  Investment Treaty News, 27 April 2006, published by the International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (<http://www.iisd.org/investment/itn>). 
86  Under WTO law, the same holds true: Art. IX(2) WTO Agreement reserves the ultimate 
interpretational authority to a three-fourths majority of Member States. 
87  See ‘Free Trade Commission Clarifications Related to NAFTA Chapter 11’, 31 July 
2001, available at: <http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta-chapter11.html>. The 
NAFTA member governments have reacted forcefully to their increasing liability under 
Chapter Eleven in a number of ways. On two occasions, they made joint policy statements to 
the effect that Chapter Eleven could limit investors’ ability to bring claims. The United States 
has taken further steps in legislation and trade negotiations to ensure that the developments in 
some Chapter Eleven cases do not become institutionalised in future FTAs between the United 
States and other countries. Art. 91 of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement, 
available at: <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/philippine/epa0609/main.pdf>, now 
repeats the NAFTA Free Trade Commission’s remarks with regard to the relationship between 
‘fair and equitable treatment’ and the international minimum standard, just like the new US 
Model BIT 2004. 
88  While the US model BIT does, the European BITs generally do not. 
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ultimate restriction on international tribunals does not work everywhere.89 Further-
more, of course, all States parties to the treaty have to agree on a common 
interpretation of a treaty norm. Nevertheless, this is a less costly and more subtle 
device than treaty renegotiation, as it allows for learning processes through a kind 
of functional renegotiation with low transactions costs and simultaneously mitigates 
the delegation problem of the States parties as arbitrators may anticipate the States’ 
reactions. 
 States might also water down the substantive protection of foreign investors’ 
rights when renegotiating BITs (or when concluding new BITs) by clarifying the 
meaning of the substantive provisions in a restrictive manner or by leaving some 
of the provisions out altogether. This reduces delegation to third parties by 
restricting progressive interpretation by means of the further specification of the 
interpretation of the protective norms in the next round of BIT negotiations (as 
the United States has done in its new Model BIT 2004). In this context, States 
write more complete contracts to clarify indeterminate legal terms, for example 
by stating that certain environmental or public security measures do not amount to 
indirect expropriation.90 States may also water down the protection of investors by 
attenuating their rights from the beginning. For example, the 2005 economic 
cooperation agreement between India and Singapore left out the highly conten-
tious provisions on fair and equitable treatment and the MFN clause. Of course, 
this means much less protection than usual in BITs. The newly negotiated trade 
and investment pact between Japan and the Philippines and the US-Australian 
free trade agreement all have usual substantive protective provisions but leave out 
the State’s ex ante consent to an investor-State arbitration mechanism.91 In this 
context, the problem of CIL also arises. As alluded to above, CIL protection is in 
principle insufficient in terms of its substantive provisions and even less clear in 
its contours than the indeterminate legal terms found in the BITs.92 One should 
note, however, that, if CIL can be established for substantive provisions, it can be 
much more forceful than treaty law – as long as there is international jurisdiction 
in the case concerned – because CIL does not provide an opt-out option in the 
—————————————————— 
89  Generally, it would be worthwhile to conduct research on the question how such a provi-
sion may change the behaviour of international tribunals or courts, depending on the number of 
treaty parties and majority requirements for changing the treaty. 
90  See, e.g., the new US Model BIT 2004, which contains interpretation rules for tribunals 
concerning the most contentious terms. 
91  See Art. 107 of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement. See the US-
Australian FTA of 18 May 2004, available at: <http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade_Agreements/ 
Bilateral/Australia_FTA/Final_Text/asset_upload_file148_5168.pdf>. 
92  On the difference between incentives under CIL and treaty law, see G. Norman and J.P. 
Trachtman, ‘The Customary International Law Game’, 99 American Journal of International 
Law (2005) p. 541, as a response to J.L. Goldsmith and E.A. Posner, ‘A Theory of Customary 
International Law’, 66 University of Chicago Law Review (1999) p. 1113. See also supra n. 14. 
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long run as treaties do.93 Every State is bound by CIL, unless it has been a 
persistent objector. Thus, the participation constraints on States are weakened. 
States may therefore only restrict progressive interpretation by tribunals of the 
question of what constitutes CIL by drafting the contract more completely as the 
United States has done.94 
 Another way of restricting the scope of the treaties is by attaching reservations 
in certain sectors by means of a negative or positive list approach. This is lauded 
by UNCTAD as a key technique for balancing flexibility and the regulatory 
autonomy of national authorities with their international commitments.95 Reserva-
tions usually restrict the protective scope of the treaty to certain industries, which 
makes them a very blunt instrument. This is illustrated by the false positive/false 
negative (type I and type II error) distinction. Generally speaking, legal errors can 
be divided into two categories: type I errors, or false positives, in which meritless 
suits are allowed to be commenced, and type II errors, or false negatives, which 
keep legitimate claims out of court. Reservations tend to produce many false 
negatives, because there is no protection whatsoever for the excluded sectors. A 
more restrictive and flexible interpretation, taking account, for example, of 
uncertainty and sensitivities in highly politicised and problematic sectors such as 
natural resources and public utilities, might be a better way to reduces the 
abovementioned errors. 
 States may also choose non-compliance, even though that may be more costly 
for reputational reasons. In this case, a State will calculate whether compliance is 
more costly that losing foreign investment in the short run. For example, Argen-
tina announced that it would not honour the ICSID awards in connection with the 
Argentine crisis of 2000-2001,96 although that statement was revoked for the 
decision on the staying of the CMS award.97 There are several (legal) ways to 
avoid being obliged to accept the execution of an ICSID award.98 
 Last but not least, States may decide to exit the treaties by not prolonging 
them. Ecuador was the first country to publicly announce that it may withdraw 
—————————————————— 
93  For an overview of the definition and different understandings of CIL, see R. Bernhardt, 
‘Customary International Law’, in R. Bernhardt, ed., EPIL (The Hague, Elsevier 1992) p. 898 
at p. 902 et seq.; A.E. Roberts, ‘Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary Interna-
tional Law’, 95 American Journal of International Law (2001) p. 757. 
94  The new US Model BIT 2004 therefore states clearly in Annex A what is to be under-
stood by CIL in investment protection. 
95  UNCTAD, Preserving Flexibility in IIAs: The Use of Reservations (Geneva/New York, 
UNCTAD 2006). 
96  See O.J. Marzorati, ‘Argentina Opting Out?’, 2 Transnational Dispute Management 
(2005) (online journal). 
97  Decision on Argentine Republic’s Request for a Continued Stay of Enforcement of the 
Award in CMS v. Argentina (1 September 2006). 
98  E. Baldwin, et al., ‘Limits to Enforcement of ICSID Awards’, 23 Journal of Interna-
tional Arbitration (2006) p. 1. 
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from its BITs,99 and Bolivia recently withdrew from the ICSID Convention.100 
Exiting a treaty may be costly, as it has a reputational effect.101 Most BITs are 
concluded for a certain period of time (e.g., thirty years with an extension of the 
protection for an additional period, say, another ten years) but may be prolonged. 
 These arguments do not only apply to developing countries. Capital increasingly 
flows from transition or developing countries such as China, India and Brazil to the 
OECD countries (or other developing countries).102 It seems that only the United 
States has gone through a learning process with NAFTA, appearing as the defen-
dant State in many cases.103 and changing its new Model BIT accordingly in 2004 by 
making it more precise, giving less leeway to arbitral tribunals.104 Until now, 
Western European States have been largely spared from appearing as defendants in 
investor-State disputes (with the exception of the European transition countries.105.). 
That might change soon under the Energy Charter Treaty, which also provides for 
investor-State dispute settlement, energy policy being a highly contested field. It 
might well be that those countries will become more cautious in negotiating BITs 
that restrict their sovereignty excessively once they realise that the reciprocity in 
those treaties exists not only de iure but also de facto. 
 It is no coincidence that minority opinions in arbitral awards issue warnings 
about destroying the system if interpretation is stretched too far. Overprotection 
—————————————————— 
99  S.D. Franck, ‘Occidental Exploration & Production Co. v. Republic of Ecuador’, 99 
American Journal of International Law (2005) p. 675; Investment Treaty News of 9 May 2007 
concerning the termination of the US-Ecuador BIT. 
100  Bolivia submitted its notice of withdrawal from the ICSID Convention on 2 May 2007. 
In accordance with Art. 71 of the Convention, the denunciation will take effect six months after 
the receipt of Bolivia’s notice, that is to say, on 3 November 2007. That does not mean, 
however, that cases cannot be brought against Bolivia before ICSID under the Additional 
Facility Rules. Furthermore, as BITs have post-termination protection, the cases under dispute 
now might still be arbitrated under those BITs. 
101  For an encompassing analysis, see L.R. Helfer, ‘Exiting Treaties’, 91 Virginia Law 
Review (2005) p. 1579. 
102  UNCTAD, supra n. 5. 
103  Indeed, after Argentina and Mexico, the United States and the Czech Republic have the 
third highest number of claims filed against them with eleven each, see UNCTAD, supra n. 29, 
p. 2 et seq. 
104  G. Gagné and J.-F. Morin, ‘The Evolving American Policy on Investment Protection: 
Evidence from Recent FTAs and the 2004 Model BIT’, 9 Journal of International Economic 
Law (2006) p. 357, who attribute, for example, the exclusion of an investor-to-State dispute 
mechanism in the US-Australian FTA to the US experience of complaints by Canadian 
investors under NAFTA, that is to say, investors from an equally developed country. For a 
similar hypothesis concerning the learning process that the United States has undergone due to 
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, see D.A. Gantz, Settlement of Disputes Under the Central America-
United States-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement, Arizona Legal Studies Discussion 
Paper No. 07-01 (2007), available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=956134>. 
105  Germany, Spain, Portugal, the United Kingdom and France were or are defendants in at 
least one well-known investment treaty case. See UNCTAD, supra n. 29, p. 12 et seq. 
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by excessively strict commitments ex ante or progressive protection ex post may 
lead to reactions from States that will weaken international investment protection 
in the long run,106 which is a normatively undesirable outcome. 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 
 
One example of effective PIL is the case of international investment protection. 
But this effectiveness comes with perils, namely that States might wish to weaken 
the system in order not to incur excessively high sovereignty costs. We therefore 
face a dilemma. International investment law may become too successful from the 
viewpoint of States, which may lead to less protection of investors in the long 
run. The point of optimality between commitment costs and benefits of FDI still 
needs to be found. 
 States’ participation constraints come into play only if the net benefit of giving 
credible commitments to investors is equal to or below zero (ex ante or ex post.). 
In addition, it may well be the case that certain host countries that are competing 
with other countries for scarce capital cannot afford to lower the standards of 
protection. But it would be short-sighted to rely on this. There might be circum-
stances in which we come close to situations in which States prefer to opt out, for 
example certain Latin American countries that, within the tradition of the Calvo 
doctrine, would return to an old attitude towards FDI. But there are also more 
subtle means of restricting investor protection. Therefore, it is useful to think of 
other less costly protection instruments for States, for example insurance regimes 
that reduce sovereignty costs. It is also useful to consider BITs that either retain 
the interpretational supremacy of the States parties or are drafted in more detail. 
This also needs to be considered when the BITs are renegotiated. It would also be 
desirable to have a more balanced approach to treaty interpretation. Even if BITs 
and ICSID are designed to foster FDI by protection, the ultimate telos of those 
laws is the development of countries.107 This is also clearly indicated by the 
—————————————————— 
106  For an analysis of the trade-off between participation, on the one hand, and the strict-
ness of a treaty through nonconsensual international lawmaking, on the other, see L.R. Helfer, 
‘Participation, Compliance, and Nonconsensual International Lawmaking’, Illinois Law Review 
(2008, forthcoming). 
107  See, e.g., CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, UNCITRAL, Final Award, 
separate opinion of Ian Brownlie (14 March 2003); and Amco Asia Corporation and others v. 
Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, decision on jurisdiction (20 November 
1984) in: 23 ILM 351 (1984) p. 369 (para. 23): ‘To protect investment is to protect the general 
interest of development and of developing countries.’ On the ICSID Convention, see Schreuer, 
supra n. 25, Preamble, para. 11. The ICSID Convention’s ‘primary aim is the promotion of 
economic development’. For a similar view, see Amco v. Indonesia, at para. 493: ‘Thus, the 
Convention is aimed to protect, to the same extent and with the same vigour the investor and 
the host State, not forgetting that to protect investments is to protect the general interest of 
development.’ 
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ICSID Convention, which otherwise could not have been negotiated under World 
Bank auspices. Although, under most BITs, States retain the right to admit 
foreign investment and are themselves probably best positioned to judge whether 
a specific investment is beneficial to their development, this does not solve the 
problem of excessively sweeping unforeseen protection ex post. Of course, the 
question of quis iudicabit is at the forefront of these problems. A more balanced 
interpretational approach might be achieved, as Judge Buergenthal suggests, by 
having stricter conflict of interest rules for arbitrators or by having a general 
appeals procedure within ICSID, as proposed by the ICSID Secretariat.108 
 A thorough economic analysis of international investment law is still lacking. 
There are intricate legal problems with a variety of actors that are difficult to 
model. In this article, for example, the ‘black box’ of State behaviour was not 
opened up in order to look at the internal processes that determine external policy. 
Nevertheless, an attempt has been made to identify the basic lines of economic 
logic governing this issue area. 
—————————————————— 
108  ICSID Secretariat, Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID Arbitration, 
Discussion Paper (2004), available at: <http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/highlights/improve-
arb.pdf>. 
